Who is behind the terrorist attack on Türkiye? | policy

The terrorist attack on the Aerospace Industries Company in Ankara came at a sensitive time in Turkish internal politics, as well as regional developments, especially the possibilities of expanding “Israeli” aggression in the region, which carries many connotations and refers to political, military and security messages to Ankara from several parties.

Attack

The Turkish Minister of the Interior said that the attack that targeted the Aviation and Space Industries Company “Tusas” in Ankara on the 23rd of October/ This October, four people were killed and 14 others were injured, confirming that the two perpetrators (a man and a woman, according to photos and videos from the site of the attack) were neutralized.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also denounced the attack, calling it a “despicable attack targeting Türkiye’s survival, safety and defense initiatives” that symbolize its independence.

Turkish media reported news of an attack on the company, which is among the most important companies in the field of defense and aviation industries in the country, and of an explosion that may have been the result of a suicide operation and intermittent clashes, in addition to reports of the presence of hostages in the hands of the attackers, before publishing about it was banned. The issue, as is usual in dealing with terrorist attacks in the country.

This is the largest attack of its kind in quite some time, as the PKK carried out its last operation in October/ October last year against the police headquarters in the capital, Ankara, which resulted in the injury of two policemen and the killing of the attackers.

While no party has, as of this writing, claimed responsibility for the attack, the method used is very similar to the traditional method of operations of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a separatist organization designated as a terrorist organization, which is further reinforced by the context in which the attack occurred.

Context: The Kurdish question

The attack came just one day after important statements by Devlet Bahceli, head of the Nationalist Movement Party allied with the Justice and Development Party and President Erdogan and known for his hard-line stance on the Kurdish issue, which greatly occupied public opinion and the backstage of politics.

Days after shaking hands with representatives of the Equality and Peoples’ Democracy Party, which is the successor to the Peoples’ Democratic Party and the current front for the leftist Kurdish movement linked to the Kurdistan Region, Bahceli, in a speech before his party’s parliamentary bloc, called on the imprisoned Kurdistan leader, Abdullah Ocalan, to deliver a speech in parliament before the Equality and Peoples’ Democracy Party’s parliamentary bloc, “announcing “There is a complete end to terrorism and the dissolution of the organization,” he said, calling for a “policy without terrorism” and “removing the historical and heavy problem of terrorism from Turkey’s agenda.”

What added to the importance of the statement and its political connotations was President Erdogan’s support for this proposal, adding that he awaits “everyone’s realization that there is no place for terrorism in Turkey’s future,” expressing his hope that “the historic window of opportunity opened by the public coalition will not fall victim to personal calculations.”

The co-chair of the Equality and Peoples’ Democracy Party, Tulay Khatam Ogullari, also said that “the beginning should be ending the isolation of Ocalan,” and stressed that “the compass for solving the Kurdish problem is political negotiations and honorable peace.”

These statements reinforced the impression of the possibility of a new political path regarding the Kurdish issue in the country, after the previous path stopped in 2015, especially since the Turkish president has been speaking for weeks about the necessity of “strengthening the internal front” to protect Turkey from the external dangers that are now threatening it with “Israel’s expansionist policies.” In the region,” as he put it, and the possibilities of regional war are increasing, according to Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.

What preceded the attack places it in the context of Turkish internal politics, specifically the Kurdish card, and this was confirmed by Defense Minister Yaşar Guler, who pointed the finger of blame at the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and is also reinforced by subsequent statements.

Bahceli himself said that “no bloody, treacherous project will be able to withstand our brotherhood and national unity,” while the former head of the Peoples’ Democratic Party, Selahattin Demirtas, said, “This time we will not allow the voices of peace advocates to be silenced.” The Equality and Peoples’ Democracy Party also affirmed its “support.” Peace and dialogue efforts are stronger than ever before.

It is important to point out that Ankara deals with the PKK as an umbrella in which there are a number of competing and perhaps conflicting movements, some of which do not want the Kurds to obtain their full rights in the country, as much as they want the terrorist operations to continue, which makes them a tool in external hands that pressures Ankara.

External messages

The details of the operation and its many signs of the attack carry external as well as internal dimensions. The attack targeted the largest aircraft manufacturing companies in Türkiye, owned by the Turkish Armed Forces and the government, which are working on developing the first locally manufactured fighter aircraft, in addition to other promising projects.

The attack also came one day after the opening of the SAHA EXPO International Exhibition for Defense, Air and Space Industries in Istanbul, in which 1,478 defense industry companies from more than 120 countries participate.

This means that there is a targeting of the defense industries sector in Turkey, which has become the most expanded and growing sector in the country, and has raised Turkey’s reputation internationally, and entered the club of arms exporting countries forcefully, especially in the field of drones, in addition to the fact that it now provides more than 80 % Of Ankara’s weapons needs in the last few years, in addition to the fact that the marches constituted about 80% of its exports in 2023.

Here, we can recall Erdogan’s statement about the need for Turkey to strengthen itself in the field of defense industries “so that Israel cannot do what it is doing now,” recalling his country’s military contribution in both Libya and the South Caucasus, and the possibility of repeating this in Palestine, a statement to which the minister responded. The Occupation Foreign Ministry threatened Erdogan with “the fate of Saddam Hussein.”

The official Turkish position also focuses a lot on the threat to Turkish national security from the “Israeli” escalation in the region, attacking Lebanon, threatening Iran and the possibility of invading Syria, as Erdogan warned, “They are only two and a half hours away from us.”

This external dimension is also reinforced with the timing of the attack, which coincided with the Turkish President’s participation in the BRICS summit in Kazan, which many view as an economic bloc competing with or an alternative to the Group of Seven countries, as it includes countries such as: Russia, China, and India, which Ankara declares Recently it sought its membership. It must be noted that the name of the city hosting the summit (Kazan) and the Ankara suburb in which the target company is located (Kazan) are identical, regardless of how intentional or coincidental this may be.

Because the Turkish pursuit of membership in the BRICS group, in addition to membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, comes in the context of unstable relations with the West, in light of the stagnation in negotiations to join the European Union and US sanctions. Due to the Russian S-400 defense system deal, Washington’s procrastination in completing arms export deals (F-16 fighters recently), the Turkish-Western tension with the war on Gaza, and Turkey’s apprehension about the role of Greece and Cyprus in any scenario of this kind, this revives a debate. “Ankara’s shift from west to east.”

In conclusion, the terrorist attack on the Aerospace Industries Company in the capital, Ankara, carried clear indications that it was linked to the possibilities of returning to an internal political path with regard to the Kurdish issue, in light of the known differences in the movements under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.

But it also carries clear indications of external pressure messages related to this file first, and then to other files, most notably the defense industries, attempts at independence in the field of arms manufacturing, the position on the war on Gaza, and the possibilities of the occupation escalating the war in the region, as well as Turkey’s relations with the United States, NATO and the European Union.

Despite all this, the attack remains limited in its impact and repercussions, especially if it was an isolated attack and not in the context of a new escalation campaign. An attack aimed at disrupting, disturbing, and delivering pressure messages, which repeated experiences have proven will have no benefit or impact on the internal paths in Türkiye.